BANGAYAN vs RCBC
G.R. No. 149193
April 4, 2011
RICARDO B. BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND PHILIP SARIA, Respondents,
Facts:
respondent RCBC presented Mr. Lao as its lone defense witness. Before the termination of Mr. Lao’s direct examination, respondent RCBC filed a Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge Pedro Santiago,73 who subsequently denied the motion.74 The Order denying the Motion to Inhibit was the subject matter of petitions filed by respondent RCBC in the Court of Appeals75 and subsequently in this Court, which were all dismissed.
In the meantime, when respondent RCBC’s witness (Mr. Lao) failed to appear at the hearing, Judge Santiago ordered that Mr. Lao’s testimony be stricken off the record despite respondent bank’s motion to have the case reset.76 After the appellate proceedings for respondent RCBC’s Petition as regards the Motion to Inhibit, however, Judge Santiago set aside his earlier Order and reinstated the testimony of Mr. Lao, subject to cross-examination.77 Petitioner Bangayan took exception to the Order reinstating Mr. Lao’s testimony, but continued to conduct his cross examination with a reservation to raise the Order in the appellate courts.78
Issue:
Is judge Santiago liable for reinstating testimony of Mr. Lao?
B. The trial court did not commit reversible error when it reinstated the testimony of Mr. Lao and allowed petitioner Bangayan to cross-examine him.
Petitioner Bangayan also assails the lower court’s order that reinstated the direct testimony of Mr. Lao, respondent RCBC’s lone witness. Petitioner claims that Judge Santiago acted with partiality by reinstating Mr. Lao’s testimony, because this Court in another case had already sustained the lower court’s earlier Order striking out the testimony. Hence, petitioner says that the judge’s reinstatement of Mr. Lao’s testimony was in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.
Petitioner Bangayan’s arguments are unmeritorious.
Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in furtherance of the convenience of the courts and the litigants, the expedition of business, and in the decision of interlocutory matters on conflicting facts where one tribunal could not easily prescribe to another the appropriate rule of procedure.125 Thus, the Court ruled:
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice. As was said in the case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U.S., 1, 9): "The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action." So in the case of Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355), it was said that "discretion implies that in the absence of positive law or fixed rule the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court below in such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a court of appeals in reviewing his action in the premises, and such courts will not therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by the court below unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or the exercise of mere "arbitrary will", or in other words that his action in the premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right of an appellate court to review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may properly be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear case of abuse of power to the prejudice of the appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in discretion.126 (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to a final judgment, trial courts have plenary control over the proceedings including the judgment, and in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, may take such proper action in this regard as truth and justice may require.127
In the instant case, the trial court was within the exercise of its discretionary and plenary control of the proceedings when it reconsidered motu propio its earlier order striking out the testimony of Mr. Lao128 and ordered it reinstated.129 The order of the judge cannot be considered as "willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion," since his action allowed respondent bank to present its case fully, especially considering that Mr. Lao was the sole witness for the defense.
The Court finds no reversible error on the part of the trial court in allowing the full presentation of the reinstated testimony of respondent RCBC’s lone witness, especially since the other party was afforded the occasion to cross-examine the witness and in fact availed himself of the opportunity. Although he expressly reserved his right to question the court’s reinstatement of the testimony of the witness, petitioner Bangayan did not satisfactorily offer convincing arguments to overturn the trial court’s order. That the court gave petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Lao – a remedy that petitioner even fully availed himself of – negates the allegation of bias against the Judge.
The timing of petitioner Bangayan’s allegations of prejudice on the part of Judge Santiago is suspect, since the latter had already rendered a Decision unfavorable to petitioner’s cause.
A motion to inhibit shall be denied if filed after a member of the court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate on the action of the court . . . (only to) raise an objection of this sort after the decision has been rendered."137
When respondent RCBC moved for Judge Santiago’s inhibition, petitioner even interposed an objection and characterized as unfounded respondent bank’s charge of partiality.138 It is now too late in the day to suddenly accuse Judge Santiago of prejudice in the proceedings below, after he has already rendered an unfavorable judgment against petitioner. If at all, the latter’s claim that Judge Santiago was biased in favoring respondent RCBC is a mere afterthought that fails to support a reversal by the Court.
Ruling:
NO.B. The trial court did not commit reversible error when it reinstated the testimony of Mr. Lao and allowed petitioner Bangayan to cross-examine him.
Petitioner Bangayan also assails the lower court’s order that reinstated the direct testimony of Mr. Lao, respondent RCBC’s lone witness. Petitioner claims that Judge Santiago acted with partiality by reinstating Mr. Lao’s testimony, because this Court in another case had already sustained the lower court’s earlier Order striking out the testimony. Hence, petitioner says that the judge’s reinstatement of Mr. Lao’s testimony was in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.
Petitioner Bangayan’s arguments are unmeritorious.
Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in furtherance of the convenience of the courts and the litigants, the expedition of business, and in the decision of interlocutory matters on conflicting facts where one tribunal could not easily prescribe to another the appropriate rule of procedure.125 Thus, the Court ruled:
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice. As was said in the case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U.S., 1, 9): "The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action." So in the case of Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355), it was said that "discretion implies that in the absence of positive law or fixed rule the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court below in such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a court of appeals in reviewing his action in the premises, and such courts will not therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by the court below unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or the exercise of mere "arbitrary will", or in other words that his action in the premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right of an appellate court to review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may properly be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear case of abuse of power to the prejudice of the appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in discretion.126 (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to a final judgment, trial courts have plenary control over the proceedings including the judgment, and in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, may take such proper action in this regard as truth and justice may require.127
In the instant case, the trial court was within the exercise of its discretionary and plenary control of the proceedings when it reconsidered motu propio its earlier order striking out the testimony of Mr. Lao128 and ordered it reinstated.129 The order of the judge cannot be considered as "willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion," since his action allowed respondent bank to present its case fully, especially considering that Mr. Lao was the sole witness for the defense.
The Court finds no reversible error on the part of the trial court in allowing the full presentation of the reinstated testimony of respondent RCBC’s lone witness, especially since the other party was afforded the occasion to cross-examine the witness and in fact availed himself of the opportunity. Although he expressly reserved his right to question the court’s reinstatement of the testimony of the witness, petitioner Bangayan did not satisfactorily offer convincing arguments to overturn the trial court’s order. That the court gave petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Lao – a remedy that petitioner even fully availed himself of – negates the allegation of bias against the Judge.
The timing of petitioner Bangayan’s allegations of prejudice on the part of Judge Santiago is suspect, since the latter had already rendered a Decision unfavorable to petitioner’s cause.
A motion to inhibit shall be denied if filed after a member of the court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate on the action of the court . . . (only to) raise an objection of this sort after the decision has been rendered."137
When respondent RCBC moved for Judge Santiago’s inhibition, petitioner even interposed an objection and characterized as unfounded respondent bank’s charge of partiality.138 It is now too late in the day to suddenly accuse Judge Santiago of prejudice in the proceedings below, after he has already rendered an unfavorable judgment against petitioner. If at all, the latter’s claim that Judge Santiago was biased in favoring respondent RCBC is a mere afterthought that fails to support a reversal by the Court.
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